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TAXATION OF THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
Among constitutional provisions controlling governmental taxation
in United States is the prohibition, grounded in due process, against
taxation to A of the income or the property of B. In the field of income
taxation, the significance of this limitation flows from the struggle be-
tween the taxpayer and the government which is precipitated by the
existence of highly progressive rates. Events increasingly attest the fact
that constitutional protection is not easily invoked by the taxpayer who
seeks to avoid the higher rate brackets through the device of "spreading"
his income. On the other hand, that the protection of due process is not
an empty thing is clear from Hoeper v. Wis. Tax Comm., 284 U. S.
206, 52 Sup. Ct. 120 (93), holding invalid a tax to the husband of
his wife's income.
Supposedly astute draftsmen early conceived the idea that by the use
of a revocable trust, the taxpayer's aims could be ideally realized within
the aegis of the Constitution. The trust device was readily adaptable
to "spreading," while the reservation of a power of revocation would
retain to the settlor the desired control; yet the scheme would be beyond
the reach of the government since all title to the income-producing
property would be vested in parties other than the settlor. Surrey, "As-
signments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable
Person", 33 Col. L.R. 791 (i933). The Treasury Department, by
reversing its former position, forced Congress in 1924 to enact specific
legislation in an attempt to nullify this avoidance device. Revenue Act
of 1924, Sec. 219 (g). The constitutionality of this section was sus-
tained in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930);
the court saying "* * * taxation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." While such judicial
attitude left little of value in the revocable trust device, draftsmen refused
to disavow their faith in it. As a consequence, the matter settled down
to a hide and seek contest between counsel and government. Although
congressional legislation of 1932 and 1934, designed to close the loop-
holes discovered by ingenious counsel, has not been tested for its con-
stitutionality, validity seems assured by DuPont v. Comm., 289 U. S.
685, 53 Sup. Ct. 766 (933); and Helvering v. Farmers' Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 85, 56 Sup. Ct. 70 (I935); respectively. See 22 Iowa L.
Rev. 390, 392; Magill, Taxable Income, pp. 280-288 (1936).
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If, however, these developments were casting increasing doubt upon
the efficacy of the revocable trust, draftsmen were satisfied that sure
relief could be had through the use of irrevocable trusts. But to their
great amazement Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 Sup. Ct. 761
(i933), decreed the non-immunity of even this device in a theaten-
ingly broad category of situations. Had the decision been limited to
situations where the trust income was directed to the payment of the
settlor's legal obligations, it would have been significant enough. For
under the influence of this reasoning, there has been taxed to the settlor
the income from an alimony trust incorporated in the decree of divorce,
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. I, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935); income
from trusts created for the support and maintenance of the settlor's
children, Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 308 (1935);
Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 304 (1935); and
income of a trust directed to the payment of the principal on a promissory
note, Helverzng v. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552, 56 Sup. Ct. 305
(1935). But more than this, Burnet v. Wells, supra, looked beyond the
category of legal obligation and, with four dissents, found the constitu-
tion unsullied though the settlor was taxed upon income directed to the
liquidation of his "social" obligations. The ill-defined limits of this
extension make the future efficacy of the irrevocable trust perhaps as
questionable as is that of the revocable; at the very least the step the
court has taken presages taxability for the settlor in any situation where
the trust device is employed in the realization of a transaction sufficiently
institutionalized to justify the view that the trust provision constitues a
form of saving to its creator. See 22 Iowa L. Rev. 390, 393; Pillsbury
v. Burnet, 67 Fed. (2d) 151 (App. D.C. 1933); Cummins v. United
States, 78 Ct. CL. 268 (1933); Thacker v. United States, 78 Ct. CL.
284 (1933).
With the trust device in this predicament, there will inevitably
develop an increasing search for more satisfactory modes of income tax
avoidance. Since 1913, the Revenue Acts have carried a provision, now
Revenue Act of 1936, Sec. I81, to the effect that, "Individuals carry-
ing on business in partnerships shall be liable for income tax only in their
individual capacity." Though designed to meet the problem of taxation
of the ordinary business partnership, the availability of this section as a
lawful device for the "spreading of income" should, in the future, sug-
gest itself to draftsmen more than it has in the past.
The possibilities offered by this provision, in so far as past litigation
can point the way, are best analyzed by a consideration of two decisions
in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Comm'r. v. Olds, 6o Fed. (2d) 252
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(C.C.A. 6th, 1932), and Humphreys v. Comm'r., 88 Fed. (2d) 430
(C.C.A. 2d, 1937). In the earlier case, the father, owning extensive
lumber interests, agreed with his three daughters to sell them each a
one-fourth interest in his property. The daughters, in return, executed
demand non-interest bearing notes for $400,000 each. The business
was to be conducted solely by the father who was to made distribution
of profits over and above their necessary expenses as he saw fit. Anyone
of the daughters could withdraw from the agreement if dissatisfied with
the management of the business, in which case the notes were to be
returned. A divided Court held this to be a partnership within the
meaning of the Revenue Act. In the later case, Humphreys, Day, and
their respective wives agreed to enter into the business of public account-
ing and tax counseling attorneys. The wives contribtued the original
capital, but the firm was later reorganized, all the parties contributing
to the capital and agreeing in return to share the profits and losses. The
principal control was necessarily retained by the husbands as their wives
were neither lawyers nor accountants, but the women had some voice
in the employment of the staff and in other less important affairs of
the firm. The court held this also to be a partnership for income tax
purposes.
A partnership inter se is a relationship existing by virtue of an ex-
pressed or implied contract between two or more persons to carry on a
business for profit. Gilmore on Partnership, Sec. I; Douglas, "Vicarious
Liability," 38 Yale L.J. 720. The Uniform Partnership Act which
has been adopted in nineteen states defines a partnership as, "an associa-
tion of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." U.L.A. Partnership Sec. 6. In the Humphrey case, it seems
clear that the parties entered intq a contractual relationship which was
binding on all. On the other hand, the Olds case does not present
so obvious a situation. Whether in fact a contract of partnership existed
depends upon the enforcibility of the notes given by the daughters, since
the detriment incurred by virtue of liability on the notes could constitute
the only possible consideration supporting the partnership contract. The
majority of the court in that case held the notes valid and, consequently,
the contract of partnership sustainable. The dissenting judge was of the
opinion that the notes were supported by illusory promises and therefore
unenforceable, basing his view upon the power of the daughters to with-
draw from the agreement in case of dissatisfaction with the management
of the business. I Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) 124 is, however,
authority for the proposition that a provision revocable on dissatisfaction
does not impair validity, since the good faith required to prove dissatis-
faction is sufficient to ground a good promise. But the finding of a valid
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contract of partnership, though essential, does not of itself demonstrate
ordinarily the existence of a partnership; there must also be apparent
certain other indicia. One of these may be co-ownership. Co-ownership
of the firm property arises out of a contribution to its capital. In the
Olds case it does not appear that the daughters contributed anything to
the capital, and so the dissenting judge declared, for the agreement to
sell was insufficient in form to carry the legal title of the property to
them. Under the agreement employed the father merely placed the
property in the partnership and took the notes in consideration of the
contract of sale. This was an attempt to short circuit the two separate
steps necessary to the result desired, and might have proved disastrous
had the majority of the court scrutinized the agreement more closely
or emphasized the taint attaching to such direct method of tax avoid-
ance. On the other hand, the facts of the Humphreys case plainly shows
that the wives contributed property to the original capital. While this
money may have come to them through their husbands, there is no indi-
cation that a prior gift of the capital by the husbands would have altered
the court's attitude. In fact the court in the Olds case went so far as to
say that a gift of the property contributed to the firm's capital would
have been satisfactory. The source of the capital contributed has not
been considered of importance in the Board of Tax Appeals' determina-
tions. Phelps v. Comm'r., 13 B.T.A. 1248 (1928); Haimngton v.
Comm'r., 21 B.T.A. 260 (933). But if either the gift or the sale
device is used caution would suggest that the plan adopted in the Olds
case of simultaneous transactions should be avoided; the transaction
designed to lay the basis for satisfaction of the requirement of co-owner-
ship should be separated in time from that of the formation of the
partnership.
Furthermore, net profit sharing is now generally conceded to be
"cogent, often conclusive evidence," that the enterprise is being carried
on for the participants. Cox v. Ifickman, 8 H.L. 268, 11 Eng. Rep.
431 (i86o); Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387
(1876); or as the Uniform Act expresses it (Sec. 7 (4)), profit sharing
is prima facie evidence of a partnership. In the Humphreys case the
contract specifically provided for profit sharing. In the Olds case the
memorandum provided that each daughter was to have such profits as
their father "sees fit to pay them, and as they may have need for their
living and comforts." If this constituted a right to share profits it was
prima facie evidence of a partnership and the only remaining question
would be the extent to which the alternative explanation of a gift would
constitute a rebuttal. This explanation would, however, contradict the
intent expressed in the memorandum as well as the obvious purpose to
avoid a surtax.
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A further test of business partnership is that of co-control. Thus
the exercise of some control by the wives in the Humphreys situation was
emphasized by the court as demonstrating the existence of a genuine
partnership. In the Olds case the two prevailing judges could point to
little control in the hands of the daughters but nevertheless declared it
to be their opinion that, "It is not essential to the validity of a partner-
ship agreement that the right to control a business * - 4- be equal."
Support for such an attitude can apparently be found in Board of Tax
Appeals rulings, the Board has held that sharing of control need not be
shown, Cobb v. Comm'r., 9 B.T.A. 547 (1927); Kahn v. Comm'r.,
14 B.T.A. 125 (1928); MacPherson v. Comm'r., i9 B.T.A. 65I
(930), unless the control exercised by the one party takes on the char-
acteristics of dictatorship. Tally v. Comm'r., 22 B.T.A. 712 (I931).
Partnership for tax liability and for tort liability involve different legal
and economic factors, and a case might be made for the proposition that
the emphasis upon co-control as a condition precedent to imposition of
tort liability is not relevant to the problem of interpreting the partner-
ship section of the Revenue Acts. Be this as it may, the significant fact
from the tax avoidance angle is that under* Sec. 181 a draftsman can
satisfy the requirements of co-control for tort liability and still reserve
for the taxpayer partner a degree and type of control impossible with the
trust device. If the suggestion of the Olds case be employed, namely
sale with notes, as it undoubtedly can be with impunity by insuring their
enforceability, there is available to the taxpayer a method of control
roughly equivalent to that so unsuccessfully attempted in the revocable
trust cases. Through reservation of a power to force a dissolution of the
partnership, the father and/or husband could at any time cause legal
title to the capital to revert back to the various members of the family;
he could then proceed against the other members in satisfaction of the
notes he holds.
While there are thus definite possibilities for "spreading" of income
in the partnership section, certain limitations upon the usefulness of this
device are also apparent. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136, 52 Sup.
Ct. 345 (I932), reveals one such limitation. In that case the husband,
a partner in an existing laundry firm, agreed to give his wife one-half
of his interest therein, she to be entitled also to share the profits and bear
the losses equally with him. The Supreme Court of the United States
held this was not a partnership under the Revenue Act since there
was no transfer of the corpus of the partnership property to a new firm
with the consequent readjustment of rights in that property and in its
management. Lower federal courts have not only held similarly at
various times, Harris v Comm'r., 39 Fed. (2d) 546 (C.C.A. 2d
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1930); Mitchell v. Bowers, 15 Fed. (2d) 287 (C.C.A. 2d 1927);
they have declared that neither an assignment of the taxpayers' "entire
interest" Battleson v. Comm'r., 62 Fed. (2d) 125 (C.C.A. 9 th 1932) ;
nor his agreement to hold his interest in trust for a third party, Balk-
well v. Comm'r., 77 Fed. (2d) 569 (C.C.A. 6th 1935), will give
tax immunity. The doctrine underlying these determinations, that there
must be an assignment of the income-producing property itself, is a gen-
eral one, see Surrey, supra, and accords with the requirement of a bona
fide co-ownership discussed above. Its peculiar significance in the case
of a partnership already in existence for other reasons lies in the fact
that a rearrangement for purposes of tax avoidance cannot be had short
of dissolution of the then existing partnership. Seldom is such a step
free of difficulties.
The courts have held in the non-tax field that the contract of
partnership of an infant is voidable, but the extent of this avoidance has
been expressed by divergent views. Mathew's Revision of Mechem's
Cases on Partnership, p. 492, note. But in the tax field the Board of
Tax Appeals, in Lidov v. Comm'r., 16 B.T.A. 1421 (1929), held that
a child of tender years could not qualify as a partner under Sec. 181.
But this restriction can be avoided by use of a trust for the children as
was done in Reeb v. Comm'r., 8 B.T.A. 759 (1927). The father
created a trust for the benefit of a minor child of his and turned the
property over to the mother who was named trustee. She, having broad
discretionary powers as to investments, then placed a part of the corpus
in the family partnership. The court sustained this partnership arrange-
ment. It might be suggested that possibly it would be more desirable
to have a guardian appointed to carry out the same purpose, especially
since the courts will usually scrutinize such trust devices.
The most significant limitation on the usefulness of the family
partnership device lies in the apparent power of Congress to tax as a
unit either the family or a partnership. Nothing in Hoeper v. Wis. Tax
Comm., supra, stands in the way; taxing as a unit does not mean the
taxing to A of the income of B but the taxation of the family or partner-
ship as an entity, each member then paying a proportionate part of the
tax in accordance with his share of the income. Such a plan was pre-
sented to Congress in 1934, but no action was taken on it.
Analysis of the cases in this field thus reveals that until Congress acts,
a wealthy person having property in his own name and not an interest
in a then existing partnership should be able to find shelter within Sec.
181 so as to "spread" his income and still retain a surprising amount of
control over it.
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